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THE SAME-SOVEREIGN RULE RESURRECTED: THE
SUPREME COURT REJECTS THE INVOCATION OF THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT'S PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION BASED UPON FEAR OF FOREIGN
PROSECUTION IN UNITED STATES V BALSYS
CARLIN METZGER*
INTRODUCTION
Applying what many commentators thought to be an outdated
theory,, the Supreme Court resurrected the "same-sovereign" rule2 in
United States v. Balsys,3 its recent decision clarifying the scope of the
Fifth Amendment's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.4  The case
involved the Government's attempted compulsion of a resident alien
to testify about potential misrepresentations on his application for a
visa to the United States.5 The witness, Aloyzas Balsys, refused to
answer the questions, claiming the privilege against self-incrimination
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2001; B.A., French,
DePaul University, 1998. Mr. Metzger is an associate in the Commercial Litigation department
at Chuhak & Tecson, P.C. in Chicago. Chicago-Kent Law Review selected this Comment as the
Best Case Comment from the 2000 Summer Candidacy Competition. Each summer, the Law
Review invites students to participate in a vigorous ten-day, limited page, closed-research
writing competition. The Law Review then selects new members from the competition based
on writing ability. The 2000-2001 Editorial Board voted Mr. Metzger's Comment, The Same-
Sovereign Rule Resurrected: The Supreme Court Rejects the Invocation of the Fifth Amendment's
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Based upon Fear of Foreign Prosecution in United States v.
Balsys, as the best Case Comment based on its insightful analysis and effective organization.
1. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in an International Context, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1201, 1215 (1998) (noting that the
same-sovereign rule "fell" with the Supreme Court's decision in Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission).
2. See infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
3. 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
4. The text of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. Balsys, 524 U.S. at 670.
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based on his fear of criminal prosecution in Lithuania, Germany and
Israel.6 The government conceded that Balsys had a reasonable fear
of prosecution in both Lithuania and Israel, but argued that the
privilege against self-incrimination did not apply when the feared
prosecution would be brought under the laws of a foreign nation.7
The case squarely raised the question of whether the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination could be invoked
based solely on a real and substantial fear of foreign criminal
prosecution.8 The issue arose in several courts, and resulted in a split
over whether the language, history, and underlying policies of the
privilege justified extending the privilege to encompass "any"
criminal prosecution.9 The Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Amendment only binds the government to which it applies; therefore,
the privilege cannot be invoked based solely upon a fear of foreign
prosecution. 1°
This Comment contends that despite the Court's revival of the
same-sovereign rule, the privilege against self-incrimination extends
to witnesses who can show a real and substantial fear of foreign
criminal prosecution, direct aid by the United States to foreign
prosecuting authorities, and a complementary system of criminal
justice in the United States and the prosecuting state. Part I of this
Comment explains the development of the privilege against self-
incrimination. Part II details the factual and procedural history of
United States v. Balsys, and examines the holding of the Supreme
Court. Finally, Part III argues that future claims of privilege based on
a fear of foreign prosecution can succeed under the same-sovereign
approach as the levels of United States and foreign cooperative law
enforcement efforts increase. The Comment concludes that courts
should use the door left open by the Supreme Court when the
cooperation between the United States and the foreign prosecuting
authority is such that the United States can reasonably be deemed
both the compelling and the using party.
6. Id.
7. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 3, United States v. Balsys, 524
U.S. 666 (1998) (No. 97-873), 1998 WL 193482 at 3 [hereinafter Balsys Transcript].
8. Balsys, 524 U.S. at 672.
9. Compare United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding the privilege
against self-incrimination inapplicable to fear of foreign prosecution), with United States v.
Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the privilege against self-incrimination
may be invoked for fear of foreign prosecution), rev'd, 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
10. Balsys, 524 U.S. at 669.
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I. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
A. The Current Understanding of the Privilege
As the law currently stands, an individual has a right to refuse to
answer questions in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative
or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, if the information could be
used against him in a criminal case in the United States.1" The
threshold question in any case is whether the individual claiming the
privilege faces a real, substantial, and reasonable fear of conviction. 12
To sustain a claim of privilege, it must be evident from the impli-
cations of the question that an answer to the question or an
explanation of why it cannot be answered might be incriminating. 3
Once it is determined that the privilege applies, it extends to answers
that would support a conviction and also to answers that would
furnish "a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute. 14
The privilege against self-incrimination is not absolute. The
government is permitted to offer the witness immunity from
prosecution in exchange for compulsion of the witness's testimony. 5
This grant of immunity, however, must be at least coextensive with
the scope of the privilege. 16 Moreover, once a defendant establishes
that he has testified under a grant of immunity, the court will exclude
evidence in subsequent criminal proceedings unless the government
proves that the evidence it proposes to use comes from a legitimate
source, independent of the compelled testimony. 7
For centuries, the modern privilege against self-incrimination has
been considered a fundamental right, 8 but its application has evolved
11. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972).
12. See Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1424 (citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896)).
13. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1964).
14. United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951), rev'd, 524 U.S. 666 (1998)).
15. See generally Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 446.
16. See id. at 442, 453. Kastigar presented the Court with the question of whether federal
immunity statutes granting immunity to witnesses against any use or derivative use of
information gained from their testimony were sufficient to satisfy the Fifth Amendment's
demands. The witnesses' primary contention was that the scope of the immunity provided by
the federal statute was not coextensive with the scope of the privilege and was therefore
insufficient to compel their testimony. They claimed that "transactional immunity" was
required in order to satisfy the true purposes behind the privilege. The Court held that the
immunity granted to a witness must be at least coextensive with the scope of the privilege, but it
was unnecessary to grant the witness full immunity from prosecution for the offense to which
the compelled testimony relates.
17. See id. at 460.
18. See United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419,1435-57 (11th Cir. 1997) (examining in depth
the history of the privilege against self-incrimination).
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significantly within the last fifty years. 19 For example, it is only in the
last forty years that the privilege has been held applicable to the
states. 20 This recent change is attributable, in large measure, to the
shift in how we view our federal system of government. 21
B. Murdock and the Same-Sovereign Rule
Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
subsequent incorporation of the rights guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights into its due process provision, 22 the Fifth Amendment was held
applicable only to the federal government.23 This view of the federal
system prevailed in United States v. Murdock,24 where the Court held
that a witness in a federal proceeding could not invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination based upon fear of
criminal prosecution in a state court.25  Murdock involved an
individual who was summoned by a revenue agent to disclose the
recipients of certain money he had spent during the year.26 He
refused to answer on the ground that the disclosure would incriminate
him under state law. 27 The Supreme Court rejected his claim, finding
that the protection from prosecution under federal law offered by the
federal government was sufficient to satisfy the demands of the Fifth
Amendment. 8 Whether he might later be subject to prosecution
under state law was of no consequence under the Fifth Amendment.
The privilege was applicable only against the "same sovereign. ' '29
Analogizing the federal system of the United States to the sov-
ereign powers of separate nations, the Court noted that "[t]he English
19. See infra text accompanying notes 31-41. See generally Amann, supra note 1, at 1220.
20. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
21. See infra notes 31-50 and accompanying text.
22. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. See also Amann, supra note 1, at 1216 (discussing the incorporation of the Bill
of Rights into the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment).
23. See Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1431 (citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110 (1908)); see
also United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 674 (1998) (quoting Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), in which Justice Marshall wrote that the Constitution's
"limitations on power.., are naturally, and, we think, necessarily applicable to the government
created by the instrument," and not to "distinct [state] governments, framed by different
persons and for different purposes").
24. 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
25. Id. at 149.
26. Id. at 146.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 149.
29. Id.
[Vol. 77:407
THE SAME-SOVEREIGN RULE RESURRECTED
rule of evidence against compulsory self-incrimination, on which
historically that contained in the Fifth Amendment rests, does not
protect witnesses against disclosing offenses in violation of the laws of
another country."30 This conception of the English and our federal
system, however, was soon called into question.3' As the under-
standing of the Fourteenth Amendment shifted to encompass the
rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,32 and as increased cooperation
between federal and state authorities became commonplace, 33 it
became clear that the "same-sovereign" rule was in need of a re-
evaluation.
C. The Incorporation of the Privilege: Malloy and Murphy
The Court gradually overturned its prior cases holding inappli-
cable to the states some of the rights today considered to be our most
basic and fundamental. 34 It was not until 1964 in Malloy v. Hogan,
however, that the Court conclusively established the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination's applicability to both state
and federal government.35 The Court held that the privilege binds to
the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,3 6 and that the privilege was to be governed by the same
standards in both federal and state jurisdictions.
In a case decided the same day as Malloy, the Court then re-
evaluated the Murdock holding.38  In Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission of N.Y. Harbor,9 the Court held that the privilege
against self-incrimination protects a witness in one jurisdiction from
being compelled to give testimony that could be used to convict him
30. Id. at 149 (citations omitted). As noted infra, Section I.C., this understanding of the
"settled English rule" was later rejected by the Court in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378
U.S. 52 (1964), but has now been given new life by the Court in United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S.
666 (1998).
31. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
33. See Amann, supra note 1, at 1218.
34. See id. at 1216-17.
35. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
36. Id. The Court stated that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion
the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement-the
right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his
own will, and to suffer no penalty.., for such silence." Id. at 8.
37. See id. at 10-11.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 21-31.
39. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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in another jurisdiction of the United States.4° The issue in Murphy
was whether a witness in state court who had been granted immunity
from state prosecution could be compelled to give testimony that
might incriminate him in federal court.41 The witnesses in Murphy
were granted immunity from state prosecution, but refused to answer
questions based on their fear of potential federal prosecution. 42 They
were held in civil and criminal contempt, and the New Jersey
Supreme Court affirmed the decision holding the witnesses in civil
contempt.43
The Court disarmed the "whipsaw"- by holding that the Self-
Incrimination Clause barred the federal government from using the
witnesses' compelled state testimony or its fruits to obtain a federal
conviction. 45  To reach this result, the Court found first that its
decision in Malloy necessitated a revised understanding of the
privilege against self-incrimination,46 and, second, that the purposes
and policies underlying the self-incrimination clause justified an
extension. 47 The Fifth Amendment privilege now encompassed both
federal and state authorities, and any gaps between the immunity
conferred by state or federal immunity statutes were filled by a
constitutionally mandated "exclusionary rule. ' '48
The Court's re-evaluation of the privilege in Murphy and Malloy
rested largely on a revised reading of English precedent and a refined
understanding of the policies and purposes underlying the privilege.49
40. Id. at 77-78.
41. Id. at 53. Whether it was testimony compelled in a state court used in a federal court or
vice versa does not matter, as the privilege applies equally in each jurisdiction after Malloy. See
id. at 53 n.1.
42. Id. at 54
43. Id.
44. See infra note 46.
45. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79.
46. Once the Fifth Amendment was held applicable to the states, it became necessary to
remedy the incongruity that a witness could potentially be granted immunity from prosecution
by the compelling jurisdiction's use of his testimony, yet be subject to another jurisdiction's
prosecution based on that very testimony despite the fact that the same privilege applied equally
in both jurisdictions. The same-sovereign rule had previously drawn criticism for just this
reason, because it permitted an individual to "be whipsawed into incriminating himself under
both state and federal law even though there is a privilege against self-incrimination in the
Constitution of each." See Amann, supra note 1, at 1214 (quoting Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357
U.S. 371, 385 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting)).
47. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
48. See id. at 79; see also United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 682 (1998) (discussing the
application of the exclusionary rule articulated in Murphy).
49. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55. The Court eloquently catalogued the policies behind the
privilege in the following passage:
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our
[Vol. 77:407
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Courts following Murphy have identified and distilled at least three
broad policy justifications as critical to the Court's holding: the
privilege "advances individual integrity and privacy, it protects
against the state's pursuit of its goals by excessive means, and it
promotes the systemic values of our method of criminal justice." 0
The broad language employed by the Court in Murphy, however, set
the stage for a debate as to the scope of the privilege, which has now
been resolved (for the time being) by United States v. Balsys.5'
II. UNITED STATES V. BALSYS
Aloyzas Balsys, a Lithuanian immigrant to the United States,
was subpoenaed by the Office of Special Investigations of the
Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice
("OSI")52 to testify about his activities during World War II and his
immigration to the United States in 1961.13 The OSI was created "to
institute denaturalization and deportation proceedings against
suspected Nazi war criminals," and was investigating whether Balsys
lied on his visa application and had in fact participated in persecution
by Nazis during World War II14 If so, he would be subject to
deportation55 for persecuting persons because of their race, religion,
national origin, or political opinion6 as well as for lying on his visa
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-
accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an
inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will
be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a
fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone
until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its
contest with the individual to shoulder the load," our respect for the inviolability of the
human personality and the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may
lead a private life," our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that
the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the
innocent."
Id. (citations omitted).
50. See United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 129 (1997); see also United States v. Gecas,
120 F.3d 1419, 1472 (11th Cir. 1997) (Birch, J., dissenting); Amann, supra note 1, 1220-21.
51. 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
52. The Attorney General created the OSI to detect and investigate individuals in the
United States who assisted the Nazis during the war and to expel these criminals from the
United States. Id. at 670.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Balsys was a resident alien who could be subject to deportation. See United States v.
Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 136 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(4)(D), 1253(h) (1997), and
noting that "[r]esident aliens suspected of Nazi activities are particularly likely to be able to
establish a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution because deportation from the United
States may not be optional").
56. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(E), 1251(a)(4)(D) (1997 & Supp. 2001) (current
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application17 Balsys refused to answer questions relating to his
application, and claimed a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination based on his fear of criminal prosecution in Lithuania,
Germany and Israel5 8
A. The District Court
The United States, through the OSI, brought a suit to enforce the
subpoena in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York. 9 The district court granted the government's motion
for an order compelling Balsys's testimony despite finding that he
faced a "real and substantial fear of prosecution in Lithuania and
Israel."6 The court found there was a high probability that Balsys's
testimony would be disclosed to Israel and Lithuania, since part of
OSI's mandate was to "[m]aintain liaison with foreign prosecution,
investigation and intelligence offices. ' '61 Moreover, the court found
that if he disclosed the information sought by OSI, he could be
deported to these countries.62 Nevertheless, the district court held
that the privilege against self-incrimination could not be invoked
based on Balsys's fear of foreign prosecution. 63
B. The Court of Appeals
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
privilege against self-incrimination is concerned with prosecution
abroad as well as within the United States, and protects against the
compulsion of testimony when there is a substantial risk that it will be
used in a foreign prosecution. 64 Finding the language of the clause
inconclusive, 65 the court examined the history and purposes
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D)).
57. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), 1251(a)(1)(A) (1997 & Supp. 2001) (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D))).
58. Balsys, 524 U.S. at 670.
59. United States v. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. 588 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
60. Id. at 599. The district court found that Balsys faced a real and substantial fear of
foreign prosecution based on Lithuania's statute punishing Nazis and Nazi collaborators for
crimes committed against the Lithuanian people during World War II. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 125;
see also id. (describing Israel's law imposing the death penalty for those who committed crimes
against the Jewish people during the Nazi regime).
61. Id. (quoting Order of Att'y Gen. No. 851-79 (Sept. 4, 1979), 28 C.F.R. § 0.55(f) (1995)).
62. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. at 596.
63. See id. at 599.
64. United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 140 (2nd Cir. 1997).
65. Cf. Daniel J. Lindsay, Comment, Tied Up by a "Gordian Knot": United States v.
Gecas's Rejection of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Cases of Foreign Prosecution, 82
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underlying the self-incrimination clause, placing substantial weight on
the analysis of the Supreme Court in Murphy.66 In particular, the
court emphasized the similarities between the "cooperative
federalism" relied upon by the Supreme Court in Murphy to justify
an extension of the privilege, and the "cooperative internationalism"
argued by Balsys.67 The court then analyzed the costs and benefits of
extending the privilege and concluded that any negative effect on
domestic law enforcement was justified by the purposes and policies
of the privilege that would be served by an extension of the
privilege.68
C. The Supreme Court
In an opini~h by Justice Souter, the Supreme Court held that the
privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to a witness fearing
foreign prosecution.69 The Court began by examining the language of
the self-incrimination clause and focusing on the language of the
clause in its Fifth Amendment context.70 In context, the Court found
that "any criminal case" referred only to any domestic criminal
proceeding.71 Finding an incongruity between its narrow reading of
the plain language of the clause and the far-reaching policies and
purposes espoused in Murphy,72 the court was forced once again to
reassess the origins of the privilege. The Court opted to reject
Murphy's historical analysis, and claimed that the Murphy decision
should instead be read consistently with Murdock.73  In rejecting
MINN. L. REV. 1287, 1299 (1998) (noting the lack of legislative history accompanying the Fifth
Amendment and the corresponding confusion among courts and scholars as to its proper
interpretation).
66. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 129.
67. The court of appeals found that the United States had a strong interest not only in
obtaining Balsys's testimony, but also in its use abroad because of the OSI's stated mission.
Balsys, 119 F.3d at 131. See also Amann, supra note 1 (arguing that increased cooperation
among domestic and foreign police authorities parallels the increased cooperation between
federal and state authorities relied upon by the Court in Murphy to extend the privilege to both
federal and state jurisdictions).
68. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 139.
69. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 669 (1998).
70. Id. at 672-73. The dissent, on the other hand, focused instead on the facial breadth of
the clause, "any criminal case," in contrast to the Sixth Amendment's limited language, which
clearly applies only domestically. See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 705 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
71. See id. at 673.
72. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
73. Indeed, the dissent claims that the majority's decision overrules Murphy. This is true at
least in part, as the majority states that "to the extent that the Murphy majority went beyond its
response to Malloy and undercut Murdock's rationale on historical grounds, its reasoning
cannot be accepted now." Balsys, 524 U.S. at 688.
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Murphy's historical analysis, the Court resurrected its reading of
English precedent originally outlined in Murdock.74
While the values that support the privilege were not called into
question, the Court certainly did not take the lofty language of
Murphy at face value. The Court stated that the values articulated in
Murphy were "lofty aspirations" rather than a practical weighing of
policy concerns that must be undertaken in a true reconsideration of
the Clause's scope.75 Evaluating the personal privacy rationale, the
Court found that far from an absolute preservation of personal
testimonial inviolability as suggested by Murphy, the Fifth Amend-
ment provides only a "conditional protection of testimonial privacy
subject to basic limits recognized before the framing and refined
through immunity doctrine in the intervening yearj ' '1 6 In addition,
while preventing governmental overreaching is a so a significant
policy rationale, it does not rise to the level of requiring recognition
of the privilege based on a fear of foreign criminal prosecution.7 7 In
the end, the Court found that its decision in Murphy was simply a
necessary consequence of the transformed federal structure of our
government in conjunction with its decision in Malloy, and that the
privilege binds state and federal governments alike.78
III. THE DOOR LEFT OPEN
Despite the Court's rejection of Balsys's claim of privilege, the
Court mentioned in dicta the possibility that the privilege might be
recognized in the future.79 This Comment argues that despite the
Court's apparent rejection of any claim of privilege based on fear of
foreign prosecution, future claimants can plausibly invoke the
privilege under the newly re-adopted same-sovereign analysis.80
Justice Souter left the door open to such an analysis, if only slightly,
74. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
75. Balsys, 524 U.S. at 693 ("The privilege has never been given the full scope which the
values that it helps to protect suggest.").
76. Id. at 692-93.
77. See id. at 693.
78. Id. at 694.
79. See id. at 698 ("This is not to say that cooperative conduct between the United States
and foreign nations could not develop to a point at which a claim could be made for recognizing
fear of foreign prosecution under the Self-Incrimination Clause as traditionally understood.").
80. Whether or not the Court's opinion in fact set forth a "test" is a matter for debate. One
court has determined that there is not a test to be applied, and has rejected a claim of privilege
under this. See In re Impounded, 178 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 1999).
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with his mention of the future possibility of extending the privilege.81
A future claim of privilege can be successful if it can be shown that a
witness has a substantial fear of foreign prosecution in a jurisdiction
maintaining a criminal justice system substantively similar to the
United States, and that the United States is providing direct aid to the
prosecuting foreign sovereign. In other words, a future claim would
have to prove that the United States is in reality both the compelling
and using sovereign.
A. A Real and Substantial Fear of Foreign Prosecution
Prior to addressing whether a claim of privilege should be per-
mitted, the threshold question is whether the witness faces a real and
substantial fear of foreign prosecution.8 2 In making this determi-
nation, courts have generally considered several factors, including:
whether there is an existing or potential foreign prosecution against
the witness, whether prosecution would be initiated or furthered by
the witness's testimony, or whether any such charges would entitle
the foreign jurisdiction to have the witness extradited from the
United States. 83  The same factors would remain relevant to any
future claim of the privilege based on a fear of foreign prosecution.
Despite the Court's apparent uneasiness with requiring courts to
wade through foreign law to make this determination,84 in reality the
burden would be slight. Courts have had little difficulty making this
very determination in the past.85 Moreover, as Balsys argued to the
Supreme Court, the witness invoking the privilege would shoulder the
burden of demonstrating the potential for self-incrimination specific
to a law or a body of laws.86 The Court's decision in Balsys, however,
81. The Court's opinion indicates that the privilege might be extended in the future if it can
be shown that the United States and its allies had enacted substantially similar codes aimed at
prosecuting offenses of international character, and that the United States was granting
immunity from domestic prosecution for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be delivered to
other nations as prosecutors of a crime common to both countries. See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 698.
82. For example, see In re Impounded, where the defendant articulated the "test" found in
Balsys as follows: the witness's fear of foreign prosecution is reasonable; the fear is based on a
foreign criminal statute substantively similar to United States law; and the testimony is being
taken with a purpose that it will be shared with a foreign government. 178 F.3d at 155.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1982).
84. See Balsys Transcript, supra note 7, at 36.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1425-26 (11th Cir. 1997); see also,
United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 124-26 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
86. See Balsys Transcript, supra note 7, at 36. The burden of demonstrating a real and
substantial fear of foreign prosecution is a difficult one to carry. See Balsys, 119 F.3d at 135
(stating that "[o]nly aliens may be deported"; citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227). Furthermore, extradition
generally requires the existence of an authorizing treaty. Id. (citing United States v. Alvarez-
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has rendered a witness' showing of a real and substantial fear of
foreign prosecution moot, unless the witness can also make a
plausible claim that both the compelling and the using authorities are,
in effect, the same sovereign.
B. Direct and Purposeful United States Involvement
In order to sustain a future claim of privilege, the United States
must be so thoroughly involved in both the compulsion and use of the
compelled testimony that deeming the proceedings to be brought by
different sovereigns would be a mere formality. This characteristic
was at the heart of the Court's decision in Murphy, where the Court
recognized that a denial of the privilege within a system in which the
federal and state authorities cooperate to achieve convictions and are
bound by the same rules was simply formalistic.87 Yet it is clear that
the "same-sovereign" rule does not literally require that the
compelling and using governments be identical. 8 The states and the
federal government fit within the framework of the same-sovereign
analysis at least in part because of the high level of cooperation
between state and federal police authorities.8 9 A similar level of
cooperation on an international scale, therefore, would be necessary
for a plausible claim of privilege to be made in future cases involving
a fear of foreign prosecution.
Both commentators and courts have noted the dramatic in-
creases in cooperation between police authorities across national
boundaries. 9° In order to pass review, however, this cooperation must
take the form of direct aid to the foreign prosecuting authorities. In
Balsys, for example, the OSI was investigating the witness for
suspected misrepresentation on his visa application.91 One of the
OSI's primary directives is to aid in the discovery and prosecution of
Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664 (1992)). "Moreover, even if an extradition treaty exists linking the
United States and the country in which a witness fears prosecution, the witness can be
extradited to that country only for acts that would also be criminal in the United States." Id.
87. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 56 (1964).
88. See, e.g., Murphy, 378 U.S. at 56 (rejecting the treatment of state and federal
government as entirely sovereign entities in light of a high level of cooperation and reciprocal
application of the same privilege).
89. See id. at 56. ("[T]he Federal and State Governments are waging a united front against
many types of criminal activity.").
90. See Amann, supra note 1, at 1203 ("Crime and criminals have become international.");
Balsys, 119 F.3d at 131 ("International collaboration in criminal prosecutions has intensified
admirably in recent years.").
91. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
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Nazi war criminals internationally. 92  Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court stated that merely providing information to a foreign nation is
insufficient to justify an extension of the privilege.93 The level of
cooperation between the United States and foreign authorities,
therefore, must rise to the level of direct and purposeful aid to the
foreign sovereign in its prosecutorial efforts. 94
C. A Complementary Criminal Justice System
Perhaps the most important factor in the success or failure of a
future claim is whether the foreign prosecution will take place in a
nation employing a system of criminal justice complementary to that
of the United States. This requirement has two components: a
reciprocal application of the privilege against self-incrimination, 95 and
a system of complementary substantive offenses.96
1. Reciprocal Application of the Privilege
After the Court's decision in Malloy v. Hogan,9 the same privi-
lege against self-incrimination that bound the federal government
applied equally to the states.98 It is upon this basis that the Court in
Murphy was able to find that the privilege invoked in one jurisdiction
had to be respected in the other.99 Similarly, a future claim of
privilege based on a fear of foreign prosecution must demonstrate
92. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also Balsys Transcript, supra note 7, at 13
("[The] OSI regards it is a proper component of its mission to see to it that information that
may be relevant to a foreign Government's consideration of prosecution is provided.").
93. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 699 (1998) ("[T]he mere support of one nation
for the prosecutorial efforts of another does not transform the prosecution of the one into the
prosecution of the other."). Cf. United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1433-35 (11th Cir. 1997).
Gecas argued that the United States was both the compelling and the using sovereign, using the
governments of Israel, Lithuania, and Germany as its agents to obtain a conviction based on his
compelled testimony. The court disagreed, finding that providing information to another
country was insufficient to make a sovereign government an "agent" of the United States.
94. The requirement of "purposeful" aid is intended to incorporate Justice Souter's
language that the "United States was granting immunity from domestic prosecution for the
purpose of obtaining evidence to be delivered to other nations as prosecutors .... See Balsys,
524 U.S. at 698 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 695. The Court predicated its denial of Balsys's privilege claim in large part on
the notion that there is no parallel provision to the Fifth Amendment's Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, which binds both the United States and a foreign sovereign in the same manner
that the Fifth Amendment binds both the federal and state governments. See id.
96. Id. at 699-700 (denying a claim of privilege based in part upon the absence of a system
of complementary substantive offenses between the United States and the foreign prosecuting
authorities).
97. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).




that the same or a similar privilege is applicable in both jurisdictions.
In Balsys, the Court made clear its belief that there is nothing
currently comparable to the Fifth Amendment privilege in any
supranational agreement. 100 A claim of such an obligation, however,
may not be as distant as the Court's language might suggest. Indeed,
the Court's opinion notes that the United States, Lithuania, and Israel
are all signatories to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR"), an agreement that contains a provision similar to
the privilege against self-incrimination. 0'
The opportunity to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination is not foreclosed. Significantly, the Court stated that
"Balsys has made no claim under the Covenant," and it declined to
address its applicability under the facts before it.10° In order to
comport with the same-sovereign theory adopted by the Court, a
future claimant must demonstrate that the United States and the
foreign sovereign are both bound by this increasingly recognized
right.
2. Complementary Substantive Offenses
A future claimant will also have to establish that the United
States and the foreign prosecuting nation have established similar
criminal codes aimed at prosecuting offenses of an international
character. 0 3 The Court did not offer much in the way of explanation
for this requirement, but it does not, on its face, seem to be a difficult
requirement to satisfy. States have modified their criminal provisions
to deal with the increasingly international nature of criminal
activity. 04 Moreover, the increase in international police collabo-
ration has led to a convergence in the goals and policies of the
disparate criminal systems.105
100. See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 695 n.16.
101. Id. (citing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR]).
The ICCPR states that "[i]n the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone
shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality.., not to be compelled to
testify against himself or to confess guilt." Amann, supra note 1, at 1253 (quoting ICCPR art. 14
(3)(g)).
102. Balsys, 524 U.S. at 695 n.16.
103. See id. at 698.
104. See Amann, supra note 1, at 1269-71.
105. See, e.g., id. at 1261.
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D. Future Claims of Privilege Today
In re Impounded demonstrates that the door for future claims of
privilege has been left open.1' 6 The case involved the invocation of
the privilege against self-incrimination by several employees of a
corporation that was being prosecuted for potential violations of
antitrust laws. 107 Despite being immunized from prosecution under
domestic law, the witnesses refused to answer questions about
activities related to foreign markets.1°8  They argued that the
internationalization of antitrust enforcement fell within the ambit of
the "test" outlined in Balsys.1°9 Although the court rejected the
witnesses' arguments, their contentions provide a perfect example of
the future claims that a witness may plausibly make within the "same-
sovereign" framework outlined by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Balsys."0
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has clarified the scope of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. Resurrecting the "same-
sovereign" rule of Murdock, the Court decided that a witness at a
grand jury proceeding cannot invoke the privilege based upon fear of
foreign criminal prosecution. This proclamation, however, was
qualified by language indicating that future claims of privilege can, in
fact, be made if worked into the "same-sovereign" framework. In
light of the purposes and policies underlying the privilege, and the
increasing internationalization of crime and law enforcement, future
claimants of the privilege against self-incrimination should seize upon
the words of the Court by invoking supranational agreements
containing a right to remain silent, and by demonstrating the
collaborative nature of the United States and foreign criminal
prosecution.
106. 178 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 1999).
107. Id. at 152.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
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